
Roger Scruton’s recent book on the aesthetics of music is substantial. It engages with a wide range of contemporary theory about music and advances its own phenomenological analysis of music. The subject matter is approached with understanding and confidence: Scruton has no time for the procrastinations of those who wonder how best to approach the tricky topic of music. His inquiry originates from a "full conception" of the subject matter and aims in the first instance to give an account of the "central instances of the art". (16/17) Naturally, less confident minds will ask here: Can a philosophical approach simply make use of such instances to assemble a theory? Should we not inquire beyond the certainties of a regional ontology and seek to clarify fundamental musical phenomena such as the listening to-, the performance of-, the making of- and the work of music before we use them to give ready answers?

Naturally, an inquiry must start somewhere. Scruton's starting is the presence and phenomenal experience of the musical work. How and why do we perceive sound as music when we listen to pieces of music? Not every acoustic experience is a musical experience. So, how is the hearing of music distinguished from the hearing of mere sound? Scruton answers this question with the assertion that music transforms sound into tones. A tone is a sound which exists within a musical "field of force" or meaning. The analogy with language can be drawn here: To hear language as language is to hear meaningful sounds. However, unlike language, musical meaning is not derived from a semantic or syntactic structure. Musical meaning is a matter of "expression". It is not generated by a set of pre-given rules. To be sure, such rules exist in music, however, only as generated by a musical practice and as a product of convention. How and why, then is music understood? What ensures that its expressive meaning can be communicated? The answer appears to be the human capacity to hear music as music. This is a difficult and apparently circular answer. Not much appears to be explained referring to the alleged unity between musical meaning and musical perception. If music is understood as music because it is heard as music what is the standard of "truth" in music? If a conscious account of music can only be given subsequently to the practice of playing and hearing music how can the practice of playing and hearing music itself transcend the boundaries of the subject? If the organisation of music is an organisation within the experience itself, what foundations remain for distinguishing music making in the first instance?

Scruton attempts to come to terms with these questions on a number of different levels.
On an ontological level, music and the musical work are neither elusive nor subjective. The musical work is an "intentional object". In attending to music we are attending to an appearance for its own sake. A description of the object of this attention occurs in essentially metaphorical terms. Metaphor generates a double intentionality revealing both the object and its mode of appearance. Its main performance is a transformation of our response and perception of the object. Experiencing music in metaphorical terms implies an presencing of music as objective sound and as "life and movement". Despite the subjective appearance then, the ontological conception of music as intentional object, as an item of Husserl's "Lebenswelt", make it possible for music to be objectified and critically discussed.

Scruton's original starting point, the distinction between sound and tone, determines much of the direction in which the author searches for answers to the question what music is. However, it also appears that this search is merely illustrative: Tonality as the desired structural principle and description how music is perceived as music appears to be presupposed as a "force of nature". This makes the inquiry look like a justification for a particular realm of music and the starting point a rhetorical device to build the argument. While tonality accounts for the transformation from sound to tone, and distinguishes noise from music, it remains questionable if its presupposition is philosophically satisfactory. Critics will challenge its absolutism on Scruton's own terms and will point to the musical works which sustain just the kind of interest Scruton identifies as characteristic of music, are "expressive" and meaningful without satisfying primarily the descriptions of tonality.

As is to be expected then, Scruton dedicates substantial sections of the book to a discussion of the aesthetics of serial and atonal music. His main criticism is focussed on Schoenberg and Adorno. On a musical level, Scruton argues, that a departure from traditional tonality achieves in fact often a retroactive re-inforcement of tonality. The compositional techniques, which on the other hand leave tonality altogether behind (eg. serialism), do not achieve what they set out to do. Scruton questions our ability to hear serial music in the way in which it is supposed to be organised. The serial organisation is an intellectual order, a "constructivist theory", with no corresponding relationship to the way music is heard. Schoenberg's "emancipation of the dissonance" does not emancipate dissonance, but dissolves it altogether as dissonance is a tonal phenomenon. In summary, the stated aim of serialism to escape from the banality of tonality and heal or purify the art of music appears to lead for Scruton to its death.

Scruton's argument for the absolutism of tonality is naturally more differentiated than can be illustrated here. It terminates ultimately in culture-critical reflections, which challenge the Marxist and post-
modern theorists. The belief of the Marxists' critics of a "bourgeois musical culture" (Adorno) that a
demise of this culture will turn around artistic decadence has in fact not been fulfilled. According to
Scruton, the opposite is the case: the mass culture is a product of democratisation. It - and not
capitalism - is responsible for the banality and sentimentality of popular music. The bourgeois culture
was characterised by a habit of domestic music making and collective singing, implying a musical
literacy and an at least rudimentary ability to create music autonomously. This culture has been
replaced with a division between avant-garde artist and bourgeois listener. The avant-garde consists of
an elite of artists committed to the use of theoretical and practical technicalities which elude the
understanding of the audience. Contrary to its claims, modernism has enforced elitist structures and
separated the audience further from the artist.

Scruton also confronts the sweeping post-modern view that aesthetic perception and value is grounded
in ideological decisions. A tempting conclusion to be drawn from cultural history reduces music and its
meaning to the forces of this history and establishes musical practice as the product of history. Music -
or more precisely- musical "style" then appears to be the exclusive product of political and ideological
orientations and interests. However, as Scruton's argument makes clear, it is one thing to show the
relevance of such orientations for musical practice and another to establish its relevance to music as a
whole and in itself. Music as music is "intrinsically aesthetic", with an autonomous purpose, requiring
a particular mode of attention (ie. listening "disinterestedly") and eliciting a particular type of response.

It is a question if Scruton's book on the whole achieves to show that and how this is indeed the case.
Critics will point to metaphysical and ontological pre-suppositions in the book. They will take aim at
Scruton's unclarified notion of "objectivity", of his failure to satisfactorily substantiate his absolutist
claims of tonality and perhaps most of all of his reliance on the "musical work" as the locus of musical
meaning. To be sure, Scruton alludes to the fact that musical meaning is created in a performative
event. His interesting analogy between music and dance has to be noted here particularly. If pursued
from the beginning it may allow to open the question of the work of music and its relation to
performance more radically. The division between performance and work, between energeia and ergon,
is possibly more substantial than Scruton's often academic philosophical thinking allows the reader to
see. An essentially "scholastic" theory, with its arguments and conclusions may not be able to reach the
dimension of the question how the work of music is present and what relationship this existence has to
the truth of music in performance. The discussions on the ontological nature of music remain usually
trapped within traditional metaphysical assumptions\textsuperscript{1} or contained to historical description\textsuperscript{2}. The reason for this may be their persistent attempt to argue with each other and to provide alternative answers and arguments from within a theoretical understanding without exposing the puzzle of music sufficiently.

Scrubton's book impresses with its display of musical literacy, understanding and knowledge. However, its degree of philosophical radicalism appears to have suffered as a result to display understanding. The book does not seem to find the understanding of music itself radically puzzling. The peculiar characteristics of music, its ambiguous presence and absence in its making and its hearing, the endurance of the work of music within the world of art are explained before they are allowed to puzzle the thinking. The obvious musical training and expertise appears eager to attract attention to itself and makes room too rarely for philosophically essential moments of ignorance.

Scrubton thinking hardly leaves the presupposed context of western art music. He essentially does not differentiate between music and musical works, although there are aspects of the phenomenal analysis, which suggest that this distinction is relevant even to his theory of music. The lack of wonder about this distinction is responsible for a bold approach, which may well have significant philosophical implications for Scrubton's thinking:

\textsuperscript{1}R. Ingaarden, \textit{The work of music and the problem of its identity}. University of California Press, Berkeley: 1986. Ingaarden considers the issue within the context of a traditional, metaphysical distinction between appearance and essence.

\textsuperscript{2}L. Goehr, \textit{The imaginary museum of music works- An essay in the philosophy of music}. Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1992. Goehr shows the concealed ontological and metaphysical presuppositions of "essentialist", analytical accounts of music and the musical work. Goehr's historical analysis argues that the "musical work" is a "regulative concept" and has emerged as a result of historical musical practice. To be sure, ontological claims must be compatible with historical phenomena and "practice\textsuperscript{3}", however, philosophy can not remain content with this as an understanding. What are the ontological characteristics and presuppositions of practice and its historical analysis itself? They can not generate an ontological understanding as they presuppose this. So, following a critique and description, the question remains, however, outside the boundaries of scholastic ontology. Goehr's analysis remains "preliminary" to the re-emergence of the question of the working of the work.

\textsuperscript{3}Heidegger's reflections on the origin of art are such an attempt. However, it is unclear if and how these could be applied to music. Furthermore, much of his thinking remains obscure when considered as thought in reflection. Nevertheless, Heidegger's "method" may show itself to be satisfactory in accounting for the phenomena. (M. Heidegger, "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes", in: M. Heidegger, \textit{Holzwege}, Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main: 1980, pp. 1-72)
The phenomenon of music has not always been approached by philosophers with an equal degree of courage and competence. This may be due to the perception that an adequate understanding and discussion of the subject matter can only occur with at least a degree of musical literacy if not a thorough acquaintance of the technical features of the art. It may also be due to the perception that music is an altogether elusive phenomenon. Its character, its subjective qualities, its mysterious presence in both performance and score appear to make it too complex to tackle on its own without being constantly referred to more fundamental philosophical problems, which, then in turn capture our attention. This notwithstanding, there have, of course, been notable examples to reflect upon music as a phenomenon of central philosophical importance. From the pre-Socratics to Adorno music has somehow occupied a peculiar place in the mind of thinkers as being either of utmost relevance (Plato, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche) or of little importance (Kant). Ever since Baumgarten's Aesthetics, it has been deemed appropriate to consider it as one of the "arts", the subject dealing with it appropriately being "aesthetics". This approach may have somewhat limited the perspectives under which music can be considered. Furthermore, it has obscured some fundamental assumptions under which the topic is being considered. It has also resulted in a steering away from those questions whose continued presence may ultimately be decisive in considering the phenomenon adequately.

In a recent work Roger Scruton subjects music to a wide ranging investigation. Scruton's approach is thorough and persistent. His book is remarkable for its detail, its combination of musical competence, understanding and for its philosophical rigour. It is courageous in its intention to deal with the subject comprehensively and face the full breadth of issues from ontological questions to cultural criticism. It is stimulating, both in the detailed analysis it provides as well as in the questions it exposes.

In the following I wish to trace some of Scruton's analysis. This analysis is - in all its depth and detail in need of being opened to radical questions. Such questions are not to be seen as a dismissive critique of Scruton's views, results or arguments. They are rather - as will become clear- the necessary platform from which the full depth of the phenomenon of music becomes visible.

1- How is the philosophy of Music possible?
In our desire to think about music, to explicate a philosophy of music, the question needs to be asked what an appropriate approach to the subject may be. Should we consider the works of music, should we consider its modes of presentation, is there such a thing as "music as such", etc? For Scruton

"a philosophy of music offers neither psychological explanations nor critical recommendations. It attempts to say what music is, prior to any explanation or amplification of our musical experience." (35)

However, to say what music is, we still require a method of gathering something about music in the first place. And this requires an - at least - preliminary understanding of music. We require a way of approaching the phenomenon appropriately. How do we gain a method of exposition which is able to consider music in itself? Or more importantly: what assumptions about music are made before we are able to consider the question what it is?

Indeed, these questions may appear highly obscure as yet. Their importance and considerable difficulty will only emerge in the course of our discussion. It is tempting therefore to be (with Scruton) dismissive of attempts to clarify an adequate mode of approach to music itself:

"So, how do we begin to define our theme? Such questions have bedevilled aesthetics in our times- and unnecessarily so. For they are empty questions, which present no real challenge to the philosopher who has a full conception of his subject. Whatever it is, music is not a natural kind. What is to count as music depends upon our decision and it is a decision made with a purpose in mind. That purpose is to describe, and if possible to extend, the kind of interest that we have in a Beethoven symphony. Other things satisfy that interest; and there is no way of saying in advance which things these will be- not until we have a clear idea of what exactly interests us in the Beethoven. The question whether this or that modernist or postmodernist experiment is a work of music is empty , until we have furnished ourselves with an account of our central instances of the art. Only then do we know what the question means. And even then we may feel no great need to answer it." (16/17)

One can pose a number of questions about this attitude: Firstly, the philosopher may indeed have a "full conception" of the subject matter. However, the philosophical approach to a subject matter requires that such a "full conception" is suspended and - through reflection- reconstituted, naturally in a clearer, more purified manner. So, should a philosophical approach not precisely attempt to question this "full conception" rather than presuppose it?

The question what music is, is not the same as the question what counts as music. The latter is based on a number of grounds and involves- to be sure - a decision. However, what counts as music is ultimately
not a philosophical question. It is a musical or musicological one. The philosophical question asks for an account of music. The decision "to count" something as music already presupposes the at least unreflected account of music. Scruton suggests that such an account could be clarified in looking at the "central instances of the art". But here, too, much is presupposed which - unless clarified- may obscure the phenomenon of music in its full significance. What constitutes this "art" in the first place? What kind of "art" is it- if indeed it is an "art"? What grounds our interest and relationship with music and musical works? In relation to which gravitational centre are certain instances "central" to the art, etc?

It needs to be pointed out that these questions should not tempt us to conclude that the above attitude is to be rejected. Rather, the following context seems to emerge: The philosophical question what music is does not - through itself- remain isolated. It immediately refers us to the question "how" music is, ie. how music presents itself to us. Thus, the question "what is music" recedes into the background. Our attention becomes drawn to the instantiations of music, to musical "objects", to modes of presentation and perception of music, to the modalities of the aesthetic interest in music and to ways of listening to and participating in music. The result of this is that -not unlike Heidegger's Question of Being- the question of music is forgotten and its place is taken by questions about musical works, musical objects, objectifiable perceptions and perspectives. It appears that the latter can be easily approached and analysed through using a descriptive method. However, it is clear that such a method always already operates within given presuppositions and "full conceptions" of the subject matter, ie. within a concealed horizon of assumptions.

I would suggest that - in order to gather our attention in a fully concentrated, philosophical manner towards the phenomenon of music, we need to remind ourselves of the question what music is whenever we consider its modes of presentation. As an appropriate mode of approach to the phenomenon of music, I wish to propose accordingly to retain this dual consciousness, ie. the simultaneous focus on the question what and how music is. This - it is my hope- can be accomplished by a constant return to the question what music is in the selective discussion of Scruton's analysis, an analysis which is essentially an analysis "how" music is. Thus, my discussion works through two "subjects"- subjects which will be seen to be to a great extent antithetical. This work hopes to expose primarily the full richness of content of these subjects (or questions). Its aim is not solely to lead them to their conclusion- although such a conclusion will be reached. Akin to a musical work- whose
movement does not exist for the sake of the final cadence, my work attempts to progress through the
determinations of the subjects, the questions, in order to bring these to full reality.

II- The presentation of music

If we attend to the modes of presentation of music we can identify a number of distinguishing features
or dimensions: (a) Music is heard (acoustic dimension); (b) Music is made and is present in the
transitory performance and the work; (c) Music moves (expressive dimension); (d) Music gathers
together (cultural dimension). Each dimension will allow us to consider a range of complex and
detailed phenomena. In turn, these will reflect upon the question what music is.

a. Music and listening, the understanding of music

Music is presented to us in the act of listening. Although not all that is listened to and heard is
necessarily music, the presentation of music occurs- to a major degree in the process of listening. What
then is listening and listening to music? Listening is an act, a performatif mode of attention towards
the external world. It requires specific "attitudes" to make selective decisions of relevance. Thus,
through the way we listen we indicate much about our interest and involvement in and with the world.
Listening is an extended process- contrary to seeing, which usually apprehends its content in an
"instant” and can thus "fixate” it- and requires continued attention and an activity, a performance from
the listener. This brings it into a peculiar relationship with time and temporality- a phenomenon which
will need to be considered further below. According to Scruton,

"music begins when people listen to sounds that they are making, and so discover
tones. Of all musical experiences, there is none more direct than free improvisation
(whether vocal or instrumental); and this should be understood as a paradigm of
listening- the form of listening from which music began.” (217)

Two issues are important here: The first is the fundamental distinction between sound and tone. This
distinction is central to Scruton's entire analysis. The second is the identification of improvisation as
the "paradigm of listening”- what does this mean? With the distinction between sound and tone,
Scruton wishes to explain two distinct experiences: the purely acoustic experience of hearing sounds -
any kind of sound including language, noise, etc and the experience of hearing musical entities
(phrases, melodies, movements, works). The distinction between (and transformation of ) sound and
tone is characterised as follows:
"A tone is a sound which exists within a musical 'field of force'. This field of force is something that we hear, when hearing tones...It may even be that the transformation from sound to tone is effected within the act of hearing, and has no independent reality. But it is a transformation that can be described, just as soon as we forget the attempt to 'find something in common' to all works that critics have described as music" (17)

It is important to note that the "transformation" of sound into tone is not attributed to any acoustic properties of the sound. It is the entry of this sound into a field of "meaning" that provides such a transformation. Becoming part of a musical organisation of some kind, the sound ceases to be mere sound and becomes tone. The order required to constitute this field of meaning is intentional. It is an "order of action" in which one tone "creates the conditions which make the successor a right or appropriate response to it". The objects produced by such order and its various aspects of organisation (melody, pitch, rhythm, etc) are likewise intentional objects - according to Scruton.

The identification of "action" as the descriptive category of musical order is an important one. It presents us with a number of additional and closely related observations. As "active", music never repeats itself. Even where a "work" is repeated- and were it in an identical manner, the fundamentally active nature of musical order excludes the possibility to present anything but a unique process to us. It also allows - strictly speaking no fixity and objectification, if we do not wish to loose its fundamental characteristic. Action frozen into observation, description and finally analysis, action devoid of "life" and its active principle ceases to be action. The action only is as long as its generating activity is at work. Even pointing towards action in its particularity, to speak of "this" action involves a falling away from the actual characteristics of action. An authentic description or grasp of action would need to show, evoke or induce a sense or experience of action. But even then such an experience can only be second hand - as the transitory and unique character of any particular action eludes any grasp and condensation within the analysis of consciousness.

This characteristic of action appears to have far-reaching consequences for our discussion of music: While it is tempting to objectify the products of the musical activity, to point to them and their features this will immediately obscure an authentic approach to the phenomenon of music. The principle of "life" and action forbids any such objectification. Where it occurs, eg. in discussions about "works" of music, etc. the musical characteristics of listening as performance (and performance as listening) become lost. There appears an inversion of essential characteristics of music: now, the objective features of the work become the reference point, the standard for the performance of listening. It has
been forgotten that it is this ever present performance of listening (be it in a physically obvious manner or in an "inner" presencing) which brings the musical work in the first place into presence- or existence.

It is quite clear now, why Scruton identifies "free improvisation" as the paradigm of listening. A free improvisation is a completely unique event. Through its performance music comes into existence which hitherto was not and does not endure- even if it is recorded completely truthfully. The identity with the performative process means that as any particular act of free improvisation, it can never be repeated or recreated. Even a description or analysis must fundamentally remain incomplete. Its main character - the suspense of a yet to be realised future, the transitory creation and leaving behind of a musical trace elude objective description. Listening is a transitory phenomenon. It does not appear to presuppose objectivity but requires a sustained performance which gives rise to such objectivity.

How, then is an understanding of music possible? What kind of "object" are we referring to when we speak of "musical understanding"? If listening is an engagement with the transitory as such, can there be any musical understanding, which, in the very least requires some defined content which allows repeatable referencing? Scruton solves these questions with a reference to the intentional character of the musical object:

"What we understand, in understanding music, is not the material world, but the intentional object: the organisation that can be heard in the experience. In listening to music, we are attending to an appearance, not for the sake of information, but for its own sake. I have no other reason for attending to the music, than the fact that it sounds as it does." (221)

The understanding of music manifests itself firstly "in the apt organisation of the musical Gestalt- the organisation that makes it live for us, and causes us to perceive tones moving in musical space, rather than mere sequences of sound." (229) The perception of tone provides "the foundation for all higher musical experiences, including those of thematic structure, development and form" (230). It is clear from this starting point that understanding in music for Scruton is ultimately the understanding of musical works. It appears to be reflexive, ie. only where perceptions have solidified into or are assumed to crystallise around some kind of object, (presumably with the aide of reflection) with aspects of form and content, can we commence to have any "understanding" in the first place. Understanding in music is, for Scruton, referential, an understanding of something- even where this involves "knowledge by acquaintance".

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This is so despite emphasising the autonomy of the intentional level in musical understanding. Although the concepts which describe the intentional order are themselves not "part of the normal 'description under which' music is heard", i.e., they refer beyond the intentional realm, the process to which they refer is clarified by their use. They "do not merely record our intentional understanding, but also amplify it, by showing exactly what we hear when we hear a melody return to its starting point, or a sequence of dissonant harmonies resolve." (233). The issue appears to be repeatedly the presumption that listening to music involves a perception of objects implying that an account of musical understanding requires an independent account of musical objects. This presumption - as we have pointed out above - needs to be put into question. Do musical objects (masterworks, etc) exist in the same way as music itself exists? This seems to be the case, especially if we take the contemporary music presentation and production industry as a paradigmatic case for music making and hearing.

However, a number of disturbing aspects related to the phenomenon of listening, and to the characterisation of the "active" principle of music put this answer into question. It appears that the modalities of listening determine the subject matter. It appears that the question "what" we hear and understand and the corresponding theories⁴ that explain this what need to be ultimately justified by referring to these fundamental characteristics of the making and hearing of music. This brings a further question into central focus: What are the ontological characteristics of music and the musical work?

b. The making of music and the work
It has been stated above that music is closely associated with listening and making. As a result music is "at work" and present as a work. This double ontological reality is peculiar and requires explanation.

What is the musical work? What relationship does it have with performance and the making of music?

⁴ Compare here Scruton's comment that "the theory of tonality is a persuasive theory of what we hear" (233). One can question this with the apparently pedantic comment: Is the theory of tonality not rather a theory how we hear? From this point of view - the point of view that puts the work into question and approaches music from the perspective of listening (just as Goethe's Farbenlehre approaches colour from the perspective of seeing) - some of Scruton's discussion of Schenker's theory could be investigated further. In particular the question in which sense Schenker's theory is to be regarded as an analysis of "works" has to be clarified (Scruton, 416) especially if it was put into the context of Scruton's comment about Hans Keller who believes "that any attempt to describe the musical structure will always falsify it, since the structure is real only as lived by the listener" (393). Without being able to discuss either Schenker or Keller in further detail here, it must suffice to point out that analysis can merely suggest to direct listening. The validity of analysis must be derived that the described can indeed be heard and makes sense to the sense of hearing. An analysis of the inaudible is meaningless for music, "what matters is the experience with which the analysis concludes" (Scruton, 427). In other words: Analysis does not reveal the content of the work but assists in the mode of approach. Analysis cannot elevate itself above listening as it is dependent on listening for its meaningful interpretation.
Again, before considering these questions directly, it may be worth being reminded how we perceive this reality. Scruton describes our experience of music as follows:

"Then there arises the peculiar double intentionality that is exemplified in the experience of metaphor: one and the same experience takes sound as its object, and also something that is and cannot be sound- the life and movement that is music."(96) Music is experienced as movement but also as "Gestalt". The suggestion of movement, implies "a spatial frame, an occupant of that frame, and a change of position within it." (49). However, according to Scruton music does not satisfy the criteria of movement of this kind: the tone world contains no mobile individuals and its spatial character is a mere illusion. (51) The movement of music occurs in and through time. The apparent spatial order is an order "spun from metaphor" (75). In the musical realm we do not encounter an objective spatial order:

"The topological character of space as a system of places and surfaces, is not reproduced in the acousmatic realm. In that realm we confront only a succession of events, ordered in time but not in space, and retaining the directionality and placelessness which are the marks of the temporal dimension. This explains, I believe, the frequently encountered view that, in the musical experience, we are confronted with time: not just events in time, but time itself, as it were, spread out for our contemplation as space is spread out before us in the visual field… For a while it seems as though we can wander in time, with the same sovereignty that we exercise in our wanderings through space." (75)

The spatial experience of music - and with it supposedly the entire experience of movement of music is a "sophisticated illusion" to which, however, we are compelled to return if we wish to describe the phenomenon of music altogether adequately. The fact that the experience of music needs to have recurrent recourse to metaphor for its description shows us its peculiar "double intentionality" mentioned above. Metaphor allows us to attend "not only to the inner reality of objects, but also to their appearance" (86). Metaphor and imagination can achieve the simultaneous suspension of perception of the two different aspects of music, ie. of the material sound "Gestalt" and the intentional object.

What then, can be said about the ontology of music? Scruton's starting point for an answer to this question focuses on the musical work. The justification is this: we identify specific works as important to aesthetic interest. And we distinguish these works from their performances. The sole ontological problem appears to be the problem of identity. There is no further need to discuss the ontology of music beyond the assertion that music consists of "intentional objects". An account of these objects can only be -according to Scruton- either metaphorical or physical:
"We should not expect a theory of musical ontology to give us an account of the intentional object of hearing. If it strays into the world where the musical individual is encountered, it is a world of metaphor- of things that do not and cannot exist. If it stays in the world of sound, then it can do no more that specify the sound patterns that make the musical experience available. There is no third possibility, which means that there is nothing further to be said." (117)

There are significant questions to be raised to this approach. It appears that the general problems unsettling the underpinning mind-matter dualism also unsettle this model of music. If music is on the one hand encountered as metaphorical on the other as physical in which sense can we refer to the existence of a unified activity of making and listening to music? What kind of existence is to be assigned to the activity of hearing and making? Does the existence of music exhaust itself in the production of an "object" or work? Quite clearly not- yet, this fact needs to be ontologically clarified. The analysis of the "intentional object" cannot follow in the footsteps of the ontological characteristics of physical objects- even if we replace the physical realm with an "intentional" one. What is meant by Scruton, if he refers to the world of metaphor as "things that do not and cannot exist" other than that? Presumably, this assertion is made in terms of physical existence or presence? The objectivity of the intentional object is still understood as presence, as "stayedness" (Staendigkeit). However, music precisely challenges such a conception of existence by its very relationship with time and temporality. Accordingly, an ontology must get to the bottom of this. There are, of course, many occasions where Scruton refers to the transient, "process" character of music and the ontological problems it presents. Already at the outset of his analysis, the ontological questions posed by the "process" or event character of music are noted and some fundamental assumptions are indicated:

"..events are fundamental items in our ontology, and no view of the world that excluded them would be complete. They are also intrinsically problematic. There is, for example, a problem about the individuation and identity of events which remains unsolved in the existing literature. Consider a car crash. How many events is this? The answer seems to be indeterminate. For the policeman it is one event; for the surgeon it is as many events as victims; for the spectator it is an inexhaustible multitude of horrors. But this indeterminacy in no way shows that there are no such things as individual events: it merely reminds us of our ontological priorities. Our world is a world of substances- things, organisms, and people; events and processes are what happen to those substances. There are 'proces' philosophers, such as Whitehead and Hartsthorne, who regard substances as participants in processes, and process itself as the fundamental reality. But their philosophy notoriously comes to grief over the idea of the individual, and finds no anchor for language in the endless flow of happening." (10)
It appears that the privilege which Scruton ascribes to the object, the work over the "working" of music is implied by the desire to fit music too into this model of substances participating in process. Against this, one must ask if music does not present a fundamental challenge to this traditional metaphysical model? Does the temporality of music indicate the need for a fundamental ontology which can come to terms with its peculiar characteristics?

One way of dealing with this question is to ignore it. Scruton appears to do just this. Although he knows that "music …exists only as heard" (451), that music - like dancing- is "a way of 'being together' which achieves the absorption in the present experience and the saturation of interest" (357) and that music is a reflection of human life (500) his analysis is in the main situated within the context of an assumed division between work and performance. Indeed, as Scruton states himself: "If we are to retain the concept of a work of music, therefore, we must distinguish those features which belong to the work, from those which are added in performance" (440)

Does a performance "add" features to a work? Is music experienced because it is "also performed" (405)? If we look at the phenomenon of performance and recapitulate the brief characterisation of hearing above, it is clear that music is only (not also) available in performance, as either real or "imagined" as reading and inner hearing of music. "Performance" is a (perhaps the) way in which music exists in the first instance. To affirm the activity of performance has some striking consequences for our concept of work: Music as performed does not "reproduce" the work. In an ontological sense it brings it to presence in the first instance. The result of any performance is a "work" which - only following the performance- becomes the object of our conscious attention, reflection, analysis, etc. In other words: the musical work is dependent for its existence on the performance which brings it to a presence. One can, of course, assert that the work is "ideally" present and the performance simply brings this ideal into concrete presence. However, what does such "ideal" presence consist in? If we mean by it an existence independent of performance, we cannot imagine what this existence may be like at all. All music qua music shares the characteristics which Scruton unfortunately only identifies in relation to improvisation:

"The work consists in what the performer does. The performance rules the work, and even if it is recorded or written down". (111)

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5 It is perhaps for this reason that Hans Keller refer to "analysis ,etc....
The difference between improvisation and interpretation of a work is in relation to the phenomenon of music and its performance not very significant. Both types of performance are essentially- as all performances- unique, purely individual actions. An interpretative re-creation of a notated score relies for its musical reality (not for its acoustic reality, perhaps) on the same ontological determinations, such as transience, uniqueness, immediacy, etc as an improvisation. A denial of this would conflate an acoustical reproduction of the material features of a work with the living creation, the making or presencing of music.

A number of uncomfortable consequences arise when this view of performance or making is emphasised: There is no longer the "work" in the traditional sense. A piece of music appears to own as many "works" as there are performances, indeed as many works as there are "makers" or listeners. An alternative consequence could be that there are ontologically insufficiently determined "works" (in which sense could they be works?) which however are only completed when they are heard and performed an infinite number of times- an altogether difficult solution. A further consequence could be that the "work" refers to material structures of pitch patterns, rhythms, etc and any "intentional" aspect is ignored as unaccountable in work terms. This appears even acceptable to Scruton to a certain extent (442) Yet a further consequence may be that the identity of "works" of music is simply arrived at by convention- by the musical practice and techné of a historically contingent artform. This appears indeed the solution favoured by Scruton (441). It is a solution that remains uncomfortable as it does nothing to answer the underlying question what constitutes the "work" character of the musical work.

Finally, a consequence to which Scruton alludes to could be that the work is "discovered" by the performance. This is indeed appealing as it relieves us to account for the relationship between performance and work any further. However the difficulty with this is embedded in the following

6 "Within limits, tempos can be varied without destroying the pitch pattern of a work, so that one performance may last half as long as another, and still be a performance of the same work." (442) This is only so on a superficial level: It could be argued that an inappropriate tempo does not merely reproduce the work at the wrong speed, but fails to produce the work at all. It is quite common to hear musicians comment on performances of works with "wrong" tempi that this was a "different piece, not at all the xxx symphony by yyy." It appears quite clear that the identity of a work cannot be reduced to pitch patterns or indeed any number of material determinations. The notated work requires the "listener" in the widest sense, the performer who plays with understanding, because he listens with understanding. What he hears are not the material determination of a work- the pitch patterns and rhythms, the dynamical indications and interpretative instructions, but a totality of which these determinations are aspects. Any philosophical theory of music must explain the fact of this totality - whatever it may be - and its relation to a concept of "work" which performance supposedly uncovers.

Incidentally, it remains uncomfortable to Scruton himself, who finds himself in close neighbourhood with the marxists and postmodernists which he would - no doubt- wish to avoid, given his succinct and compelling criticism of much of their aesthetic theory.

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question: Will all performances discover the work, or only some? And if the latter, what decides and why when the work is indeed discovered?

Despite these questions, the consequence that could be upheld is that the performance searches for the work. This, quite clearly, relieves us of the need to make further determinations about the work-character of the work, unless we presuppose a search for the work in which the work is somewhat "given" but concealed. Accordingly for this consequence to stand, it will need to remain a peculiar solution to the ontological question of the music: The performance searches for the work of art - not, however, as something that has been lost and needs to be found again, but as something it needs to establish in the first instance.

There are a number of difficult questions which arise from this view. Given that we regard music to be expressive, what is it that is expressed? Is there any content in music to which expression refers to or which it represents?

c. Music and expression

In line with the above comments, the question of expression needs to be investigated in relation to the question of the musical work. When we speak of expression in music, we refer to the expressive content of a musical object. This object is somehow thought to exist and its expressive properties attach to it- as tertiary qualities attach to a tertiary object\(^8\). The consequence is to search for a structure of the object in which the expressive qualities manifest themselves. As I have suggested above, however, the unclarified ontology of the musical work- its potential lack of objectivity altogether and its dependence on performance and enactment, makes such an approach to the phenomenon of expression extremely questionable. Accordingly, an account of expression needs to be developed which does not make expression and expressiveness the result of the presence of expressive qualities. Such an account is discussed by Scruton in the context of his discussion on Croce and Hegel. Croce supposes- according to Scruton

> "that the expression of a work of art is integral to the form in which we discover it; indeed that it is not detachable… Expression must be grasped in the particular experience of the particular work, if it is to be grasped at all. In which case the only way to identify what is expressed by the last movement of the 'Jupiter' Symphony, is to play the last movement of the 'Jupiter' symphony" (151)

\(^8\) Scruton, 160-65
Scruton's objection is that this view reduces expression to a "pseudo-relation" and loses the idea of an "aesthetic content" altogether. Is this necessarily so? If expression is dependent on performance for its existence, then - from the point of view of objectified performance, of the condensation of the act of performance, expression attaches to the work. Such an expression can be described, analysed, discussed, however, in order for us to understand what it actually means that we attempt to describe, this expression requires enactment, lived experience, or - as Scruton calls it- knowledge by acquaintance. So, the expression is indeed a "pseudo-relation" if it is intended to relate to the work of music as such. The falseness of the relation is based on the illusion that the work is an object with properties when - as a matter of fact- it is a performance, an act which precedes objectification.

The second issue of "aesthetic content" is harder to illuminate. What would be the "content" of a work of music? In Scruton's repeated discussion of the aesthetic theory of the 19th century Viennese Critic Eduard Hanslick this question is discussed at length. Hanslick objects to an expressive content of music in the form of definite "emotions" based on the fact that this would require "what music cannot offer- the representation of some 'definite' object". (348) Instead he conceives of music as "toenend-bewegte Formen" (tonally-moving forms) allowing only for an intransitive notion of expressiveness in music. This, according to Scruton, is problematic:

"Hanslick has given us no alternative to the theory that he criticizes: on the contrary, he has tacitly accepted its most important claim- that music is the object of a metaphorical perception, whereby it is lifted from the physical realm of sound and placed in the intentional theatre of our sympathies." (353)

While Scruton's objection to Hanslick may be justified, the understanding that musical works contain a particular emotional content is nevertheless ontologically naïve - as I have repeatedly indicated above. For, what is the "work of music" with its expressive content? Whatever a particular work of music may express appears to only become clear when this "work" is performed - in the mind of a listener, by the public performer, by the listening audience etc. Thus, a particular performance can be said to display an expressive content which may be quite different from an expressive content explicated by another performance. Since a "work" is meaningless without realisation in some kind of performative process any statements about the expressive content of the work are incomplete and require a description or analysis relative to this performative process. The work and its supposed expressive content are not merely "transcribed" in performance like a code of instructions. It is created in performance and in this
creation its expressive content manifests itself in the aesthetic response, the sympathetic movement of
the soul of the listener.

This description of expression raises, to be sure, a number of questions and objections. First and
foremost will be the concern, that it is "subjectivist". This will be followed by the question, how the
"value" of an aesthetic response is to be assessed objectively and - furthermore- how there can be any
aesthetic judgement, eg. separating trivial works from acknowledged masterworks. There will be
further questions, namely, if the expression attaches to the performance or to music itself and how
expression can be shared and validated or identified.

I do not wish to engage with these questions at this point except to point out that they have little
relevance for my current movement of thought. The movement of thought followed by this paper is
determined by the question "what is music". If the issue was a "theory of expression", these questions
would need to be addressed. However, before the fundamental ontology of music is not clarified, such
a theory will always fail on the question of the relationship between performance and work, performer
and listener. The question "what is music" will re-assert itself. Even where- with Scruton- the account
of musical expression does not focus on the properties and relations of a pre-supposed expressive
object but instead identifies the receptive state of mind (the 'recognition of expression') such a
description still takes its lead from the presumed ontological distinction between reception by the
listener and presupposed presence of the work. I have attempted to make this distinction questionable
by looking at the phenomena of work and performance in their rough ontological outline.

There are other possibilities to question the fundamental nature of a musical work further. Interesting
questions are raised by Lydia Goehr in the historical analysis contained in her excellent book The
imaginary museum of musical works. Goehr shows that the concept of work is historically contingent
and that it has emerged as a "regulative" concept within a particular cultural practice. While Goehr's
analysis is most important, it so as preliminary to the ontological question of what music is.